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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC., 
a corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
DON ALLEN, dba MT. NEBO 
CATTLE COMPANY, et al 
Intervenors and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 1 7269 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from portions of the Judgment granted 
by the Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, sitting by designation as Judge 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, on July 26, 1980, which denied an award of certain 
claimed damages against Plaintiff-Respondent, arising out of an 
alleged wrongful attachment of certain cattle. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial, submission of memoranda and oral argwnent, 
the trial court granted a money judgment in favor of Intervenors-
Appellants on some of their claims and denied judgment on the 
other claims which are here under appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Intervenors-Appellants seek reversal of the judgment 
insofar as it denied the award of additional damages in favor of 
Intervenors against Plaintiff-Respondent. 
This Court will observe that the present appeal is a 
companion to Case No. 17270, wherein First Security is the 
appellant as to the money judgment actually awarded against it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The issues presented by this appeal concern only the 
alleged damage liability of Plaintiff-Respondent First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First Security") to the Intervenor, Don 
Allen, d.b.a. Mt. Nebo Cattle Company, and his wife (for 
convenience, the term "Intervenors• is used). All other issues as 
to all other parties have been previously decided. Even though 
this appeal is limited to the damages which the court below found 
too speculative to support a judgment, a brief statement of the 
principal background facts will be helpful to an understanding of 
the issues presented. 
On or about April 20, 1972, First Security made a series 
of loans to J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc. for the financing of certain 
-2-
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!eeder animals (Tr. 486-489). These loans were evidenced by three 
~omissory notes (Tr. 486-89; Exhibits A-42 to A-44) and were 
;ecured by a series of properly perfected security interests in, 
tnter alia, the cattle of J.B.J. (Tr. 488, 489; Exhibits A-4S to 
~49). The loans totaled $218,200.00. 
In the latter part of 1972 and early 1973 it became 
apparent that the financial condition of J.B.J. was deteriorating 
rapidly. The notes were seriously delinquent (Tr. S02, S03, 
Exhibit 60), J.B.J. became overdrawn in its checking account at 
First Security by as much as $60,000.00 (Tr. SOO), and serious 
shortages (approximately 39 2 animals) appeared in the inventories 
~cattle securing the notes (Tr. 494-SOO, S22). It was also 
apparent that the cattle kept at the J .B.J. Feedyards premises 
were not being adequately cared for, and did not have sufficient 
feed or medication. Also, the corrals were an absolute quagmire 
(Tr. 40S-410, Sll). Dr. Jensen, the veterinarian, "felt sorry" 
for the animals (Tr. 406). 
In addition, First Security representatives saw that some 
of the J .B.J. cattle carried two brands, including a strange 
~and, "VS" on the right ribs. Many of the then recent sales of 
J.B.J. cattle included animals bearing the VS brand (Tr. 102 and 
Exhibits A-33 to A-37). Upon checking, the Bank determined from 
the state officials that such brand was registered to a "Mt. Nebo 
Cattle Co.•, Goshen, Utah (Exh. A-3). Mr. Broadbent of the Bank 
asked Mr. Boswell (who was a •double agent• for both J .B.J. and 
-3-
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Mt. Nebo) about the VS brand and was told it was Mr. Boswell's 
brand. Mr. Broadbent assumed that J.B.J., with management of 
Boswell, was selling animals under a different name (Tr. 
505,507). Mr. Boswell paid for and filed the registration (Tr. 
242). At that time, no knowledge of Intervenors' interest was 
held by First Security, and the public filings (Exh. A-3) showing 
Mt. Nebo Cattle evidenced nothing by which Intervenors themselves 
could be identified. Two days after First Security filed the 
attachment action, Mr. Broadbent learned of the claims of Don 
Allen, Intervenor (Tr. 566) and the litigation proceeded to test 
those claims. 
Plaintiff commenced the initial action on February 7, 
1973 to recover the sums owing by J.B.J. Feedyards. (Civil No. 
38191, Fourth District Court for Utah County). On the same day, 
it filed an appropriate Attachment Bond and Affidavit in Support 
of Writ of Attachment, whereupon the Clerk of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court duly issued a Writ of Attachment (R. 522). The 
Writ was thereafter levied by the Sheriff of Utah county upon 
certain livestock located at the feedyards operated by J.B.J. The 
cattle were subsequently moved to the Lazy S Ranch, also in Utah 
County, where the animals received care, medication and proper 
feeding (R. 405-410, 436-440, 522). The attachment was effected 
only after consultation with the veterinarian who examined the 
cattle (R. 405), and after the directors of J.B.J. had requested 
that First Security take such action (R. 392; Exhibit A-41). 
-4-
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On February 9, 1973, Intervenors were granted leave to 
intervene in this action and filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of 
Attachment, claiming that the cattle belonged to them and not to 
J.B.J. On or about February 21, 1973, all parties, including 
rntervenors, stipulated that the livestock be sold for the highest 
obtainable price, and that the funds be held awaiting disbursement 
in accordance with the findings of the Court (Exhibit A-14). 
On April 6, 1973, Intervenors' Motion to Quash Writ of 
Attachment was granted. The subject cattle were sold prior to 
trial, and the proceeds were held, subject to the disposition 
thereof according to the findings of the Court. In the meantime, 
Zions First National Bank filed suit against First Security, 
claiming a security interest in the same cattle through 
Intervenors (Civil No. 38327, Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
State of Utah). 
The trial was held in Civil No. 38327, wherein Judge 
Ballif found and adjudged that all of the subject cattle belonged 
to Intervenors. The judgment was appealed by First Security to 
the Utah Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial 
rourt in Zions First National Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah, 
~, 534 P.2d 900 (Utah 1975). That decision specifically 
reserved the issues presented in this appeal, i.e., whether 
Intervenors are entitled to additional damages resulting from the 
attachment. 
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Subsequent to the Utah Supreme Court decision on the 
prior issues, the Bank satisfied the judgment by paying to Zions 
First National Bank and Intervenors, on May 16, 1975, the proceeds 
from the sale of the cattle, less sums awarded by the Court to the 
Bank as a setoff for costs incurred in feeding the cattle prior to 
sale. The discharge of that decree is evidenced by a Satisfaction 
of Judgment signed by Zions Bank and Intervenors (R. 1649). 
Important to the issues here is the fact that Intervenors or their 
bank received the sum of $106,720.58 in May, 1975, representing 
every penny of the net proceeds of the sale of the cattle 
including interest to the date of satisfaction. (That figure is 
net of the feed bills paid by First Security to preserve the 
animals.) 
The trial giving rise to this appeal concerned only the 
issue of whether First Security is liable to Intervenors for 
damages resulting from the attachment in addition to the sale 
proceeds already paid. By Judgment dated July 26, 1980, the 
Honorable Joseph I. Dimick found that First Security had acted 
maliciously and without probable cause, and thus was liable for 
damages to Intervenors as a result of the attachment. 
Despite the generous nature of the damages which were 
granted for what was clearly not a wrongful attachment as argued 
in the companion brief of First Security as appellent (Case No. 
17270), Intervenors seek to have this Court impose additional 
damages which the lower court found conjectural and speculative. 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COMMENTARY ON THE RECORD. 
Plaintiff-Respondent First Security believes it will be 
~seful to the Court, in review of the lengthy Record before it, to 
have this party's designation of those portions of the Record 
which are most relevant. The complexity requiring such 
designation arises from the fact that the Record submitted by the 
clerk of the lower court includes transcripts and pleadings from 
the prior trial which are not really relevant to this appeal. The 
case designated below as Civil No. 38,327, Zions First National 
~nk vs. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., concerned the issue of 
title to the cattle, was tried, appealed and disposed of, and the 
judgment paid. It is not helpful for the Court on the present 
appeal to look at more than a few of the documents pertaining 
thereto. Intervenors' Complaint and Petition for Damages on which 
~e subject trial proceeded is part of the record (R. 1653), and 
is to be deemed part of this case initiated by Plaintiff-
Respondent First Security Bank, No. 38,191 below (R. 164). The 
findings, conclusions, judgment (R. 1592) and satisfaction of 
Judgment (R. 1649) are relevant, as in: 
File No. 3, No. 38,327 Civil, Fourth District 
Court, showing ink stamped pages 1579 to 1734. 
Except as just noted, Respondent here submits that this Court 
~ould consider as immaterial to this appeal (and a waste of time 
-7-
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to review) the volumes of the Record designated in the following 
manner: 
File No. l, No. 38,327 Civil, Fourth District 
Court, Record on Appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Utah, No. 13725, beginning with a title page 
showing both a "l" and a "456" in ink stamped 
page numbers; 
File No. 2, No. 38,327 Civil, Fourth District 
Court, Supreme Court No. 13725, beginning with a 
pleading consisting of an Intervenor's Motion, 
showing both a "219" and a "229" in ink stamped 
page numbers. 
Transcript of trial during various days from 
January 2, 1974 to February 13, 1974: Vol. I, 
showing pages 1-322 (typed) and pages 458-779 
(ink stamped); Vol. II, showing pages 1-753 
(typed) and pages 780-1210 (ink stamped); and 
Vol. III, showing pages 1-1120 (typed) and pages 
1211-1578 (ink stamped). 
Respondent here further submits that the relevant 
portions of the record to be reviewed as part of this appeal, and 
to which citations are made in the briefs of the parties, and the 
volumes designated in the following manner: 
File No. l, No. 38,191 Civil, Fourth District 
court, beginning with page l of the Complaint of 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., page ink 
stamped "164", and ending with a minute entry 
page ink stamped "333"; 
File No. 2, No. 38,191 Civil, Fourth District 
Court, beginning with page 1 of an Intervenors' 
Rebuttal Memorandum, ink stamped page "332", and 
ending with a certificate page ink stamped "152"; 
File No. 3, No. 38,191 Civil, Fourth District 
Court, beginning with a Title Page, Civil No. 
38, 191, Supreme Court No. 17269, ink stamped 
-8-
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page n1", and ending with a page of a stipu-
lation and order ink stamped page •151" 
Transcripts of trial proceedings December 11, 12 
and 13, 1978: Vol. I, showing pages 1-191 
(typed) and pages 615-805 (ink stamped)i Vol. 
II, showing pages 191-A-604 (typed) and pages 
806-1218 (ink stamped). 
Various exhibits marked A-1 through A-78 
pertaining to the foregoing. 
Intervenors-Appellants and Plaintiff-Respondent refer to the 
transcript of trial by the typed page numbers in their respective 
briefs. 
POINT II 
THE ADDITIONAL DAMAGES CLAIMED BY INTERVENORS ARE 
SPECULATIVE, CONJECTURAL AND EXCESSIVE. 
It is not necessary to repeat here the arguments made by 
First Security in its Appellant's brief in the companion case No. 
17270. The Court is already cognizant of the position taken by 
First Security to the effect that the attachment of the cattle 
which were later determined by the court to be those of 
Intervenors was a good faith act of the Bank taken to protect 
cattle which it then believed to be collateral to its loans to 
J.B.J. Feedyards. Based on that position and related arguments, 
First Security bas asserted that no money judgment in favor of 
lntervenors should have been rendered. The argument here, in 
contrast, proceeds on the assumption, arguendo, that even if the 
-9-
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lower court's findings regarding a wrongful attachment were 
correct as partially supporting the judgment now existing in favor 
of Intervenors, the additional damages for which Intervenors seek 
relief from this Court are so speculative, conjectural and 
excessive as to be entirely outside the realm of propriety or 
law. Accordingly, those portions of the judgment appealed from 
which denied the additional damages should be affirmed in all 
respects. 
The grounds for additional damages will be analyzed 
separately as follows. 
A. Loss on attached Animals 
Intervenors argue that due to the attachment of the 
cattle and the subsequent theorized weight loss in moving the 
cattle, that Intervenors' cattle were sold at a loss. The trial 
court was convinced that a preponderance of evidence did not 
exist, and denied Intervenors' purported damages for this claim. 
1. The Applicable Law. 
The law on this proposition is clear. Unless it can be 
shown by a preponderance of evidence that damage was actually 
suffered, no damages will be awarded. 
"Formerly the tendency was to restrict the 
recovery to such matters as were susceptible of 
having attached to them a pecuniary value, but 
it is now generally held that the uncertainry-
referred to is uncertainty as to fact of damage, 
and not as to its amount ••• " (emphasis 
added). 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bee v. San Pedro and S.L.R. Company, 50 Utah 167, 167 P. 246, 253 
(1917). 
In a more recent case the Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
"[D)amages to a business or enterprise need 
only be proved with sufficient certainty that 
reasonable minds might believe from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the damages 
were actually sufferred." (emphasis added). 
Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 515 P2d 442, 445 (1973). 
In order for Intervenors to recover the purported damages 
for loss on attached animals they were required to demonstrate by 
a preponderance of evidence that they actually suffered damages, 
and with a reasonable amount of certainty the amount of damages 
suffered. The burden of proof was not met on either proposition. 
2. No Damage Occurred. 
Intervenors were completely unable to show by any 
credible evidence that damages even occurred. Computations from 
Exhibit A-16 show that the average weight of 210 bulls one week 
before attachment was 1264 lbs. At the time of sale after 
attachment the average weight of these bulls was 1325 lbs. This 
means that from the period of time of one week before the 
attachment to immediately after the sale the cattle had an average 
iain of 61 pounds per animal. When the Court observes from the 
evidence the deplorable conditions in which the Bank found the 
cattle prior to the attachment, with overcrowding, lack of 
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sufficient feed, lack of proper medication, lack of proper 
segregation, evidence of starvation and dead animals left in the 
stockyard, it is very evident that Intervenors were not damaged by 
the attachment and subsequent removal from the J.B.J. yards to 
another feedyard where the cattle were cared for under supervision 
of First Security. In fact, Intervenors actually benefitted from 
having the cattle attached and removed from J.B.J.'s guagmire to 
the Lazy S yards where they gained an average of 61 pounds. Had 
the cattle remained in the J.B.J. properties the Intervenors' 
investment in these cattle would have rapidly diminished. 
In their Brief, Intervenors claim $28,929.48 as loss 
(compared with $44,000.00 claimed in the original Petition for 
Damages and $37,248.84 claimed in their memorandum after trial). 
The most recently claimed figure apparently is derived from 
testimony of Dr. Carpenter (Tr. 135-136) and the rough 
calculations shown on the first page of Exhibit A-16. None of 
Intervenors' figures are well founded. They seem to be created 
from a combination of the supposed loss of weight and loss of sale 
value, curiously gathered in a convoluted mix of logic and fact. 
In order for the Court to follow the general ideas of Intervenors 
and the counter-argument of Respondent herein, it is useful to 
refer to the respective exhibits and to the original Findings of 
Fact signed by Judge Ballif at the time he determined that the 
attached cattle belonged to Intervenors (R. 1592). 
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Finding No. 23 and paragraph 5 of the June 4, 1974, 
Judgment (R. 1612) confirm that the subject attached cattle were 
sold for $114,459.07. The foregoing total of 266 can be 
retabulated to show a total of 213 bulls, 22 cows, 21 steers and 
10 heifers. These are the only cattle with which the Court at any 
time should be concerned. Yet at the very outset of the analysis 
of Intervenors' damage claims, we find a gross discrepancy on the 
first page of Exhibit A-13 wherein some 282 head of cattle are 
tabulated under the title of "Loss on Attached Animals", consist-
ing of 222 bulls, 22 cows, 23 heifers and 15 steers. This raises 
the serious question at the outset as to whether Intervenors are 
even discussing the same cattle in their evidence before the trial 
court in this action. But giving them some benefit of the doubt 
regarding both mathematics and identification of cattle, we 
proceed to demonstrate why Intervenors' claims are still 
impossible. 
3. Purported Loss on Sale Value. 
Intervenors' attempt at demonstrating damages isolated 
214 bulls (which is only one more than the number tabulated in the 
Findings of Fact). Boswell's testimony was to the effect that the 
pages of Exhibit A-16, consisting of weight slips and sale 
documents, supported the information on which he and Intervenor 
Don Allen and Dr. Alvin Carpenter based their testimony 
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(Tr. 140). Carpenter's calculations on the first page of Exhibit 
A-13 as to weights and costs, however, differ from Carpenter's 
calculations on Exhibit A-16. Even Mr. Boswell admitted that he 
could not explain the discrepancies (Tr. 147-148) and or. 
Carpenter acknowledged that he relied on Boswell's figures (Tr. 
163, 164, 168). The cost figures on Exhibit A-13 have no 
foundation or backup documentation or evidence whatever, thus 
making them entirely unreliable. The purported loss of $13,351.51 
on 282 head of cattle cannot possibly relate to the 214 bulls or 
the 266 cattle referred to in the Findings of Fact, and is simply 
not supported by credible evidence. 
A close study of all of the documentation in Exhibit A-13 
and Exhibit A-16 will show that the conclusions reached in rough 
form by Dr. Carpenter (Tr. 135-136) were based upon incorrect 
evidence and faulty calculations. Dr. Carpenter could not verify 
weights on which he based conclusions, or even the dates the 
animals were weighed (Tr. 170). The following discussion and 
tabulations will demonstrate that point very convincingly. 
An examination of Exhibit A-13 and the backup documents 
thereto show that Intervenors' attempt to demonstrate the cost 
(and the purported dollar loss) of the attached animals creates 
many more questions than can be answered thereby. The invoices 
from which the cost figures are supposedly taken are invoices or 
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shipping memoranda during the month of January, 1973, from Don 
~llen Livestock to Mt. Nebo Cattle Company, covering some 533 
animals, of which 317 were shipped to the feedyards operated by 
J.B.J. Of that latter number, 239 bulls were shipped to the 
J.B.J. yards. It is assumed by Intervenors that some of the 
animals which were attached were the same animals thus shipped by 
Don Allen, but no other evidence really tied the two groups of 
animals together. Aside from that uncertainty, however, it 
clearly appears from the tabulation of the backup documents from 
Exhibit A-13, that after excluding the animals shipped to packers 
and other destinations, and also excluding the animals other than 
the bulls, a total of 239 bulls was received at the J.B.J. 
Feedyards, costing a total of $100,292.62, or an average cost of 
1419.63 per bull. Comparing that figure with the Findings of 
Fact, it will be seen that the 266 animals enumerated therein as 
1ttached animals were sold for a total price of $114,459.07, or an 
1verage sale price of $430.30. Comparing that with the average 
rost, it shows that Intervenors actually realized a gain of $10.67 
~r head on the animals, even assuming, arguendo, that the bulls 
m Exhibit A-13 are the same bulls in part which were made the 
subject of attachment. These figures are from Intervenors' own 
evidence, or from the prior findings of the court, and are not 
subject to any other interpretation in favor of Intervenors. The 
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following tabulation shows that the evidence presented by 
Intervenors in Exhibit A-13 simply did not support the claims made 
regarding a possible loss of the sale of the cattle. Intervenors 
did not take the occasion to analyze their own evidence carefully 
enough to see that their evidence disproved their own case: 
SUMMARY OF COST OF CATTLE SHIPPED TO J.B.J. 
FEEDYARDS PER EXHIBIT A-13 BACKUP DOCUMENTS 
ANIMALS SENT TO FEEDYARD 
Ref. 
No. 
9001 
9002 
9003 
9004 
9065 
9006 
9007 
9008 
9009 
9010 
9011 
9012 
9013 
9014 
1973 
Date 
1/15 
1/11 
1/12 
1/12 
1/18 
1/18 
1/20 
1/20 
1/20 
1/23 
1/23 
1/23 
1/27 
1/16 
Bulls 
19 
19 
26 
30 
34 
27 
35 
31 
18 
239 
Other 
18 
22 
7 
5 
26 
$100,292.62 divided by 239 
From Findings of Fact: 
Total 
Invoice 
Cost 
$15,267.87 
15,467.67 
14,431.02 
14,835.84 
14, 051. 66 
13,741.24 
16,131.26 
15,176.09 
N/A 
12,616.53 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Memo of 
No. Shipped 
Elsewhere 
11 
30 
52 
41 
81 
l 
216 
Total Cost 
of Bulls 
in Feedyards 
$ 7,840.25 
7,167.94 
10,140.78 
12,029.06 
15, 051. 66 
11,594.17 
16, 131. 26 
15,176.09 
5,161.31 
$100,292.62 
$419.63 average cost of bulls 
266 animals sold for $114,459.07 - $430.30 average sale 
price or gain of $10.67 per head 
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4. Purported Loss on Weight. 
A similar analysis with reference to the weight loss 
claimed under Exhibit A-16 will show that the documents disprove 
rather than prove the claims of Intervenors. Dr. Carpenter's 
claim that the attached animals weighed 1,369 pounds each, on the 
average, and were sold at a weight of 1,325 pounds each, is again 
a conclusion based upon faulty documentation. The weight slips on 
which both Dr. Carpenter and Mr. Boswell relied as part of Exhibit 
A-16 show that all of the bulls weighed therein totaled 210 in 
number and 265,475 pounds aggregate, for an average weight of 
1,264 pounds per head. There is absolutely no evidence whatever 
supporting Dr. Carpenter's calculation of 1,369 pounds per head at 
the time of the attachment. The sales invoices which are part of 
Exhibit A-16 are probably more reliable, since they came from 
Producers Livestock Marketing Association, an independent cattle 
auction, and were not manufactured by Intervenors. Using the 
computation of 1,325 pounds per animal average weight at the time 
of sale after attachment by First Security Bank, and comparing 
that figure with the correctly tabulated average weight of 1,264 
pounds per head approximately one week before that attachment, it 
will easily be seen that the cattle had an average weight gain of 
61 pounds per animal between the time of the January 31, 1973, 
inventory, and the subsequent sales after the attachment. Once 
again, therefore, Intervenors benefitted from the care of the 
animals by the Bank, rather than receiving a loss thereon. 
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Fat 
Bulls 
10 
18 
13 
16 
12 
4 
73 
ANALYSIS OF WEIGHTS AND COUNTS OF ANIMALS 
Feeder 
Bulls 
12 
12 
10 
10 
8 
9 
ll 
11 
15 
8 
10 
ll 
10 
137 
73 
137 
PER WEIGHT SLIPS PART OF EXHIBIT A-16 
Weights in Lbs. 
Bulls Only 
15,760 
14,940 
14,600 
12,240 
17,955 
12,550 
18,570 
9,980 
ll, 490 
13,390 
15,650 
19,290 
18,900 
8,810 
14,600 
13,430 
14,650 
12,400 
6,280 
265,475 lbs. 
Heifers, Cows 
and Steers 
10 
8 
14 
22 
11 
65 
Other Weights 
in Lbs. 
10,270 
7, 710 
13,030 
22,800 
9,780 
63,590 lbs. 
Total bulls 210 - 1264 lbs. average weight prior to attachment 
From Exhibit A-16 average weight upon sale of cattle was 1325 
lbs., thus showing an average weight gain of 
61 lbs. per animal. 
Since both the weight differential and the price 
differential are properly computed in favor of First Security's 
defenses and against the claims of Intervenors, it must be 
concluded by the Court that Intervenors suffered no loss whatever 
by reason of the attachment, care and subsequent sale of the 
cattle by the Bank. Therefore, the trial court's determination 
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:hat damages for this claim should not be granted must be upheld 
w the Utah Supreme Court. 
B. Loss on Forced Sale of Central Montana Livestock 
Company. 
Here we find an item of damages set forth for the first 
time at trial and not contained in Intervenors' Petition for 
Damages or Pre-Trial Statement of Facts. The claim should be 
disallowed for that reason alone. Additional conunents are 
appropriate, however, on the merits (or lack of merit) of the 
claim. 
Intervenors allege that they were forced to sell a 
trading company at a loss because all their working capital was 
Ued up in Utah as a result of the attachment of their cattle. 
Intervenors cite no legal authority for this assertion in their 
~ief to this Court. 
Damages will be rejected as speculative, remote or 
conjectural unless the cause of these damages can be ascertained 
iith reasonable certainty. The court in Donahue v. Pikes Peak 
~utomobile Co., 150 Colo. 281, 372 P2d 443 (1962), citing from 
~lorado National Bank v. Ashcraft, 83 Colo. 136, 263 P.23 (1928) 
1hich in turn quoted with approval from Rule v. McGregor, 117 Iowa 
H9, 90 N.W. 811 (1902), said, 
Uncertainty as to the amount of damages is not 
an obstacle in the way of their allowance. 
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Uncertainty as to the cause from which they 
proceed is what has occasioned trouble, and only 
when it cannot be ascertained with reasonable 
certainty that these have sprung from the breach 
alleged are they to be rejected as too remote, 
or conjectural or speculative (emphasis added). 
372 P.2d at 447. 
In this fact situation the cause of the sale for a loss, 
if there was a loss at all, cannot be ascertained with reasonable 
certainty and the damages claimed are, therefore, speculative. 
The sale of the attached cattle, which sale was approved in 
substance by the Intervenors in a stipulation (Exhibit A-14), 
occurred in the early part of 1973. The proceeds of this sale, 
less a court approved setoff for feed purchased to sustain and 
nourish the cattle, were deposited with the lower court pending 
the outcome of the prior litigation. At the conclusion of that 
litigation the sum of $106,720.58 representing such net proceeds 
was promptly handed over to Intervenors in May of 1975 (R. 1649). 
The livestock auction was sold in 1977 or the first part of 1978 
(Tr. 348). Intervenors claim that "working capital" tied up and 
later paid as sale proceeds in May of 1975 caused the disposition, 
at a loss, of the auction business in 1977 or 1978. 
However, Intervenors admitted that other factors related 
to the decrease in cattle sales and profitability of the auction, 
such as adverse financial transactions with one David Pedley, 
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heavy obligations on the ranch and the business, adverse business 
conditions, as well as the lack of capital (Tr. 349). The gap in 
time between the time the $106,720.58 was paid to Intervenors and 
the time of sale of the auction was at least a year and a half, 
and at most two and a half years, during which time any one of a 
nwnber of factors could have caused the sale. It cannot be 
stated, and was not stated with reasonable certainty by 
Intervenors, that they were forced to sell the auction in 1977 or 
1978, on the ground that they didn't receive the proceeds from the 
sale of the cattle prior to 1975. 
Even assuming that by some stretch of mental processes 
it could be shown by Intervenors that the attachment of cattle in 
1973 caused the forced sale of the auction in 1977 or 1978, the 
measure of damages sought is totally inappropriate. The figure 
of $76,950.94 was reached by taking the "cost" of the company, 
i116,950.94, and subtracting from that the sale price of 
approximately $100,000.00. Interestingly enough, official 
reports to a government agency (Exhibit A-21) show the Intervenors 
carrying the auction as an asset valued at $166,000.00 in 1972, 
H66,000.00 in 1973, $110,000.00 in 1974 and $124,000.00 in 1975. 
None of these figures correspond in any degree with the claim that 
the company "cost" $176,950.94 contrasted with the alleged sale 
~ice of $100,000.00. 
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Another point becomes painfully evident. Even assuming 
that Intervenors had made some connection between the proceeds of 
the cattle received in May, 1975, and the working capital needed 
for the auction business (which connection was never made in the 
evidence), it is clear that it would have been the same fund of 
working capital which Intervenors also claim was necessary for the 
business of buying and selling livestock and, in part, the 
purported commodity market transactions. This court cannot 
countenance an attempt to seek damages where the Intervenors think 
they could have used the same fund of money three different places 
at the same time! 
c. Lost Business Opportunities in Trading Livestock in 
Montana. 
Intervenors claims that sales in livestock trading had 
increased every year up until the year of attachment. The year 
after the attachment sales were cut in half and in each succeeding 
year sales decreased. Intervenors estimate that they lost trades 
of 83,717 head of cattle over the period in question and that the 
•conservative" gross profit on each head of cattle was $8.00. As 
with the preceding claim, no legal authority is cited for the 
proposition, only that, "this is not speculation as to either the 
fact of damage or the amount of the damage.• (P.26 of Intervenors' 
brief) The trial court awarded $126,000.00, plus prejudgment 
interest of $39,574.80. By asking for another $514,207.24, 
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Intervenors apparently believe that by continuing to escalate the 
astronomical estimates of damages, the legal foundation therefor 
will somehow improve. 
The law in Utah reflects an aversion to speculation about 
lost anticipated profits. The exact amount of lost profits does 
not have to be shown precisely, but there must be a reasonable 
basis for their estimation, as well as their foreseeability and 
causation by First Security Bank. 
The basis and general rule is that loss of 
anticipated profits of a business venture 
involve so many factors of uncertainty that 
ordinarily profits to be realized in the future 
are too speculative to base an award of damages 
thereon. The other side of the coin is that the 
damages to a business or enterprise need only be 
proved with sufficient certainty that reasonable 
minds might believe from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the damages were actually suffered. 
~warth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 183, 187, 515 P.2d 442, 445 
11973) (claim for lost profits from Christmas tree venture 
considered too speculative to be submitted to jury). Accord, 
Gould v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah 
2d 187, 194, 309 P.2d 802, 806-07 (1957) (plaintiff's claim for 
lost profits due to telephone directory error rejected as 
speculative without proof of particular lost clients); United 
States v. Griffith, Cornall & Carman, Inc., 210 F.2d 11, 13 (10th 
. 
Cir. 1954) (corporation's evidence of lost profits due to 
government's negligence considered speculative and claim denied); 
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Devries v. Starr, 393 F.2d 9, 14-20 (1968) (lost profits awarded 
only where plaintiff's business was predictable and elements of 
prediction were well-documented.) 
Courts of other jurisdictions have held that in order for 
anticipated profits to be claimed as an element of damages the 
business claimed to have been interrupted must be an established 
one and it must have been successfully conducted in order to 
ascertain the lost profits. 
"In 25 C.J.S, Damages, § 42b p. 518, it is 
stated that in cases where the loss of 
anticipated profits is claimed to have been 
interrupted it must be an established one, and 
it must be shown that it has been successfully 
conducted for such a length of time and has such 
a trade established that the profits therefrom 
are reasonably ascertainable. (emphasis added) 
Dieffenbach v. Mcintyre, 254 P. 2d 346, 349 (Okla. 1953). 
Intervenors have again failed to show causation between 
the effects of the attachment and the alleged loss of sale of 
83,717 head of cattle. Intervenors would have this Court believe 
that the attachment of 266 cattle in 1973 brought about the sales 
loss of 83,717 head of cattle. As mentioned earlier, Intervenors 
admitted that other factors related to the decrease in the cattle 
sales (Tr. 349). Intervenors simply cannot talk this Court into 
believing that the adverse results of the attachment, for which 
the Intervenors were ultimately paid every dollar in May 1975, 
represented the only negative factor in the cattle business for 
Intervenors during the succeeding years. 
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Even if the court were to find that the effects of the 
attachment proximately caused the lost business opportunities or 
anticipated profits, the damages claimed are far too speculative. 
The calculations and evidence presented by Intervenors are 
incapable of convincing reasonable minds with any degree of 
certainty that these damages were actually suffered by the 
Intervenors. The hard evidence painfully but surely brings death 
to the damages computations which so mercilessly burden the record. 
In the initial testimony of Intervenor Don Allen, and the 
corresponding testimony of Dr. Carpenter, it appeared that the 
damage figures testified to regarding livestock sales represented 
a "net profit" projection of $8.00 per head (Tr. 205). However, 
upon cross-examination, Don Allen admitted that such figures were 
"gross profit" figures, and that expenses would have to be 
deducted from such gross profits (Tr. 354). Yet at no time did 
Intervenors attempt to modify the astronomical gross prof it 
projections by any meaningful expense projections, thus making the 
profit projections entirely unrealistic ab initiol 
The absence of any evidence whatsoever to support the 
$8.00 figure completely undermines the foundation for the 
testimony of Dr. Carpenter, and also renders thoroughly unreliable 
the testimony of Intervenor Don Allen, so far as the damage 
computations are concerned. 
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ANALYSIS OF NET PROFITS FROM 
LIVESTOCK TRADING PER EXHIBIT A-21 
Gross Value Gross No. Of 
of Livestock Dealer Animals Net 
Year Purchased Profit Sold Ex12enses Profit 
1972 $5,004,877.75 $181,614.11 46,500 $167,154.36 $14,459.75 
Average: 
$3.91 
1973 $5,083,456.20 $136,679.00 22,053 $150,130.29 ($13, 451. 29) 
Average: 
$6.20 
1974 $4,289,444.67 $ 87,346.00 18,876 $132,553.00 ($42,207.00) 
Average: 
$4.63 
1975 $2,818,359.11 $ 22,567.10 14,854 $128,805.41 ($83,022.06) 
Average: 
$1.52 
The $8.00 per head gross profit figure used by Intervenors 
(brief, pg. 26) is patently absurd. Analysis of Exhibit A-21 
demonstrates that the gross dealer profit, divided by the number 
of animals sold, ranged from a low of $1.52 in 1975 to a high of 
$6.20 in 1973. In 1972, the year before the attachment, before 
any of the alleged effects of the attachment took place, the gross 
profit figure was only $3.91, a far cry from the "conservative" 
$8.00 gross profit figure advanced as legitimate by Intervenors. 
Moreover, the 30% expense figure arbitrarily used to 
subtract from the "conservative" $8.00 gross profit figure has 
absolutely no foundation. Again, Exhibit A-21 graphically points 
out how low the 30% expense figure used by the Intervenors is. 
-26-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The percentage of expenses to gross dealer profit ranged from a 
~of 92.03% in 1972 to a 570.7% figure in 1975. The 1972 
expense to gross profit figure of 92.03% is more than three times 
the figure used by Intervenors to calculate the anticipated 
profits they seek to recover as damages. The 30% figure used in 
the brief defies reason and has absolutely no basis in past 
performance for credible use in a damage calculation. 
The Intervenors' brief (p. 14) graciously admits that 
Intervenors did not show a high net profit in 1972 or in 1973, and 
a quick perusal of Exhibit A-21 reveals that a net profit wasn't 
achieved in either 1974 or 1975. In order to recover anticipatory 
damages, one must reasonably expect to make profits in the 
future. The years 1972 through 1974 show a miserable track record 
in regard to net profits. As was stated in the Oklahoma case 
Diffenbach v. Mcintyre, supra, pg. 24, in order for loss of 
profits to be recovered as damages R(i]t must be shown that it has 
~en successfully conducted for such a length of time and has such 
a trade established that the profits therefrom are reasonably 
~certainable." 
Phrased another way, in 1972, the year before the 
attachment and the year of the highest volume of livestock sold by 
Intervenors, a net profit of only $14,459.75 was realized. Yet 
Intervenors would have us believe that if not for the attachment, 
they could have earned somewhere between $400,000.00 and 
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$670,000.00 over the next three years in following the same 
business! Such claim is patently absurd. 
The lost business opportunities or anticipated profits 
damages sought by Intervenors should not be awarded because, 1) it 
has not been shown with a reasonable certainty that the effects of 
the attachment in fact caused the decline in sales; 2) the figures 
used by Intervenors to calculate these damages have no basis in 
fact or logic; and 3) The court cannot award damages for 
anticipated profits, when the Intervenors have not demonstrated 
the prior ability to have a consistent profit-making concern. 
D. Loss on Prospective Future Commodity Market 
Transaction 
Intervenors allege that they entered into an enforceable 
contract with a broker to invest $10,000.00 in the cattle futures 
commodity market right after the Bank released its attachment of 
the cattle. Dr. Carpenter testified that if the Intervenors had 
made the investment, they would have made an astounding 
$926,608.00 profit! The trial court, realizing the blantantly 
speculative nature of damages sought in this claim, declined to 
award a judgment. Nevertheless, Intervenors continue to press 
this conjectural claim. 
Respondent must comment that the purported damages 
arising from the •phantom" commodities market transactions are 
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those which should be most shocking to the conscience of the 
court. For Intervenors to claim that with a $10,000.00 investment 
in February, 1973, profits of $926,608.00 would have been realized 
in the ensuing months, is so incredulous as to defy the 
imagination. The Court must consider: 
1. Intervenor Don Allen had never engaged in the 
commodities futures market in the past, and, therefore, had no 
established business and no experience on which he could base his 
speculation as to when he might have bought and sold the futures 
contracts (Tr. 57). 
2. The stockbroker, Bert Thurber, described the rather 
casual discussions in which he had engaged with Intervenor Don 
Allen concerning the possibility of a futures commodity 
investment. Thurber himself was not licensed as a broker in that 
business at the time. On what was purported to be an oral 
contract, unenforceable because of the statute of frauds, as well 
as other reasons, Don Allen expressed his desire to invest 
$10,000.00, contingent upon his receipt of that money from Utah or 
some other source. When asked why the brokerage firm did not seek 
to enforce the purported contract against Don Allen, when he 
failed to invest the $10,000.00, Thurber clearly stated as his 
last response in the cross-examination: "He had no obligation• 
(Tr. 116). That admission alone completely destroys the 
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supposition of Intervenors that any damage claim can be built upon 
an unenforceable non-obligatory discussion about the possibility 
of a commodities market investment. 
3. Even assuming, without admission, that some kind of a 
contract was entered into relating to the commodities futures 
transaction, computing any possible profits therefrom assumes so 
many variables that the evidence becomes speculative and 
conjectural beyond belief. Nothing whatsoever was forseeable. 
All of the witnesses testifying on this matter, Don Allen, Bert 
Thurber and Alvin Carpenter, agreed that no person could have 
known in advance of the proper time to purchase, sell, and 
purchase again the various commodities contracts which would be 
involved, for the purpose of realizing the profits now claimed by 
Intervenors (Tr. 353). The damages computations were based upon 
the supposition that Don Allen would enter the market in February 
of 1973, sell the contracts in August, 1973, and make his first 
profiti re-enter the market again on the down side of the 
commodities futures, and sell all of the contracts in April, 1974, 
at which time another profit would supposedly have been realized 
(Tr. 178, 352). Neither the court nor the witnesses could 
possibly believe that the parties contemplated in February, 1973, 
at the time of the loose talk concerning a $10,000.00 possible 
investment, that either Don Allen or the brokerage firm would be 
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able to have such powers of future prediction as to be able to 
enter the market, sell again, re-enter and sell again at all of 
the right times, in order to achieve the unbelievable and 
astronomical profits so claimed. Again, Respondent submits that 
all of such evidence is nothing but speculation and conjecture, 
and cannot possibly have solid evidence enough to be a foundation 
for any damage award in any dollar amount. 
The law cited with respect to the preceding claim applies 
to this claim also, except that the Court should be even~ 
stringent in its analysis when the claim resembles one for profits 
expected of a new enterprise. Intervenors had never engaged in 
the commodities futures market in the past (Tr. 57). The policy 
of the law opposing such speculation is demonstrated in this 
situation, for no solid basis exists upon which profits can be 
predicted. "All the authorities are unanimous in holding that 
prospective profits to be derived from a business which is not yet 
established but one merely in contemplation are generally too 
uncertain and speculative to form a basis for recovery.• Jenkins 
v. Morgan, 123 Utah 488, 486, 260 P2d 532, 535 (1953) (evidence of 
damages for loss of use of land for farming purposes considered 
too speculative and uncertain to constitute basis for award). 
~ccord, Sims v. Western Steel Company, 403 F. Supp. 450, 454 (D. 
Utah 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1975) 
(patent licensor allowed damages for lost prospective profits due 
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to breach of licensing agreement. On appeal, no evidence of 
injury or damage was found, and liability for the breach was 
reversed), and Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 
468, 471 (1964) (damages for anticipated profits from ranch 
disallowed as speculative and uncertain). 
A court in another jurisdiction, in a case involving 
speculation profits, held: "But lost profits must be proved with 
reasonable certainty; damages which are remote and speculative 
cannot be recovered (citations omitted) where a plaintiff is 
conducting a new business with costs unknown, prospective prof its 
cannot be awarded." O'Brien v. Larson, 11 Wash. App. 52, 521 P.2d 
228, 230 (1974) The idea of investing in the commodity futures 
market is clearly a new business for Intervenors, and under no 
circumstances can such prospective profits, let alone 
unconscionably high profits, be awarded. 
Damages should not be awarded under this claim because 
any damages sought would be utterly speculative and unconscionable. 
E. Failure to Award Sufficient Attorneys Fees 
The trial court awarded the intervenor $10,000.00 
in attorneys fees, and $2,000.00 in prejudgment interest. 
Intervenors' counsel seeks an additur of $67,420.46. He bases 
this claim for additional attorneys fees on the case of Pacific 
Coast Title Insurance Company v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Company, 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 906 (1958), which counsel 
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improperly interprets to say that "attorneys fees should be 
treated as the legal consequences of the original wrongful act 
and may be recovered as damages" (P. 28 of Intervenors' brief). 
As to the claim that this Court held in Pacific coast 
Title that attorneys fees should be treated as the legal 
consequences of the original act and are recoverable, Chief 
Justice Crockett in a concurring opinion in a later case stated, 
It has been consistently declared in our cases 
over the years that attorney's fees cannot be 
awarded except in three instances: as provided 
by statute, or as agreed by contract, or where 
it is a legitimate item of damage resulting from 
a wrongful act. (cite to Pacific Coast Title) 
Capson v. Brisbois, 592 P.2d 583, 586 (Utah 1979). 
Judge Crockett then added, in defining a "legitimate item": 
(speaking of an interpleader action) [I]f the 
court is convinced that the ends of justice so 
require, he may award reasonable and necessary 
attorney's fees. However, that should be done 
only when such an award comes within the 
standard rule for awarding damages: i.e. those 
damages which should reasonably have been 
foreseen would result from the wrongful conduct. 
592 P.2d at 586. 
From the reading of both Pacific Coast Title and Capson, 
a two dimensional test appears of whether attorney's fees should 
~ awarded 
1. Is this a legitimate item of damage 
resulting from a wrongful act? 
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2. Are the attorneys fees damages that should 
have been reaonsably foreseen as a result 
of the wrongful conduct? 
The situation at hand presents some interesting matters 
of interpretation. First, the Bank's act was not •wrongful". 
Secondly, the attorneys fees sought by Intervenors were extremely 
unreasonable. The attorney for Intervenors sought $75.00 per hour 
for non courtroom work and $100.00 per hour for courtroom work; 
both of these figures are well in excess of what a small law firm 
in the city of Provo would charge during the years involved. 
Interestingly enough, of the $67,420.46 asked for by Intervenors' 
lawyer, only $1,251.70 was actually paid by Intervenors between 
the years of 1972 and 1975 (Exhibit A-21). Where such generous 
and expensive attorney's fees are claimed, the court can only 
speculate as to why such were not billed to or paid by the client 
in the relevant years. 
In conclusion, this Court may not award attorneys fees as 
damages, because it was not reasonably foreseeable to the Bank 
that an attachment would result in litigation and consequent 
attorneys fees, the Bank's attachment was not a wrongful act, and 
the attorneys fees sought as damages are highly unreasonable. 
F. Additur For Damages Due to Anxiety, Embarrassment, 
Worry & Concern 
Intervenors ask for an additur in the sum of $50,000.00 
plus prejudgment interest of $22,500.00 in this claim. Inter-
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ienors contend that they suffered humiliation in their small town 
because of the after-effects of the alleged wrongful attachment. 
In addition they have suffered anxiety evidenced by sleepless 
nights over the last few years as a result of the actions of a 
'large, powerful national bank•. 
The issue of whether damages can be awarded for anxiety, 
etc., turns on the question of whether the acts of the Bank can be 
termed as wrongful, which in turn depends upon whether the court 
finds that a wrongful attachment took place. Again, this issue 
was addressed at length in First Security's brief to the court as 
appellant in case No. 17270. 
Intervenors claim that the cases of Deevy v. Tossi, 21 
C.2d 109, 130 P2d 389 (1942), and Hyde v. Southern Grocery Stores, 
197 s.c. 263, 15 S.E. 2d 353 (1941), allow damages for mental 
anguish without showing malice or ill-will. Deevy involved an 
action for malicious assault and battery, and certainly doesn't 
stand for what Intervenors claim. In Hyde, malice was an issue, 
contrary to Intervenors' claim, but was a jury question. The 
court in Hyde said: 
•Malice may be inferred from the want of 
probable cause1 it may be inferred from facts 
and circumstances. Probable cause is said to 
consist in a reasonable belief in the existence 
of facts necessary to sustain an attachment, 
such belief being founded on circumstances which 
would be sufficient to produce such a belief in 
a man of ordinary caution, that is, founded upon 
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reasonable grounds ••. Under the admitted 
facts, the question of malice and probable cause 
was properly left to the jury (emphasis added). 
15 S.E. 2d at 359. 
It is obvious that the Bank had probable cause to attach 
the cattle. The Bank had no desire or intent to inflict tortious 
damages on anyone at the time of the attachment. It was 
thoroughly convinced that the cattle attached were those under the 
security interest from J.B.J. Feedyards, and no other possiblity 
seemed plausible. 
The anxiety complained of by Intervenors did not create 
any actual damages and, in any event, was not proximately caused 
by the Bank. Such anxiety, not resulting from an intentional 
tort, nor from any wrongful act whatever, was remote from the good 
faith actions taken by the Bank, and is of such uncertain and 
speculative nature as to be outside the scope of permissible 
damages in this case. 
G. Additional Punitive Damages 
Intervenors rely heavily on the finding of the trial 
court regarding the attachment, the very foundation of which is 
questioned in case No. 17270. Intervenors then emphasize 
melodramatically the great wealth of First Security and demand an 
addition of $400,000.00 and prejudgment interest of $180,000.00, 
to the existing damage award of $143,101.48 of the trial court. 
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The standard for awarding punitive damages in the courts 
of Utah is set forth in Paombi v. D&C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 
452 P.2d 325, 328 (1969), •In order to justify their imposition it 
must appear, not only that there was a wrongful invasion of the 
plaintiff's rights, but that it was done willfully and 
maliciously" (emphasis added). Accord, Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 
2d 152, 374 P.2d 380 (1963); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1975). Malice in the context as a prerequisite for an award 
of punitive damages has been defined in the following way. 
Malice as a basis 
intentional doing 
cause or excuse. 
not only intended 
ascertained to be 
was wrong when he 
for punitive damages means the 
of a wrongful act without just 
This means that the defendant 
to do the act which is 
wrongful, but that he knew it 
did it. 
Loucks v. Alberquerque National Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191, 
199 (1966). Malice has also been defined as •the motive and 
willingness to vex, harass, annoy, or injure". Haun v. Hyman, 223 
C.A. 2d 615, 36 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1964) 
In order to award punitive damages, actual malice, not 
just legal or implied malice, must be present. An Ohio case, 
Columbus Finance Inc. v. Howard, 38 Ohio App. 2d 7, 311 N.E 2d 32 
(1973), involving an action for wrongful attachment, stated: 
In tort actions the question of punitive damages 
may not ordinarily be submitted to a jury in the 
absence of actual malice. (emphasis added) 
The court in Columbus then went on to say: 
-37-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thus, ordinarily, proof of only legal malice is 
not sufficient to justify an award for punitive 
damages but, rather, actual malice must be 
proved before punitive or exemplary damages may 
be awarded. Legal malice and actual malice are 
not synonomous. (emphasis added). 
311 N.E. at 35. 
The Columbus court then cited the case of Pickle v. Swinehart, 170 
Ohio St. 441, 166 N.E. 2d 227 (1960), for a definition of "actual 
malice 0 • 
Actual or express malice has been defined as 
that state of mind under which a person's 
conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will, 
a spirit of revenge, retaliation or a 
determination to vent his feelings upon other 
persons. 
311 N.E. 2d at 35. 
Intervenors have not even remotely shown that the Bank's 
conduct was malicious and willful, let alone the even more 
stringent standard of actual malice, "that state of mind under 
which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will, 
a spirit of revenge, retaliation or a determination to vent his 
feelings upon other persons." Quite to the contrary, First 
Security has taken great pains to show in its appellant's brief 
in Case No. 17270 that its actions were actuated by an abundance 
of probable cause, good faith and lack of malicious intent 
(p. 7-15). 
Moreover, punitive damages should be granted with great 
caution. 
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[T)he purposes of punitive damages ••• are: a 
punishment of the defendant for particularly 
grevious injury caused by conduct which is not 
only wrongful, but which is willful and 
malicious so that it seems to one's sense of 
justice that mere recompense for actual loss is 
inadequate and that the plaintiff should have 
added compensation; and that the defendant 
should suffer some additional penalty for that 
character of wrongful conduct; and also that 
such a verdict should serve as a wholesome 
warning to others not to engage in similar 
misdoings ••• [T)his is an extraordinary 
remedy •.• [I)t should be applied with caution 
lest, engendered by passion or prejudice because 
of defendant's wrongdoint, the award becomes 
unrealistic or unreasona le • • • 
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975). 
An award of punitive damages must not be the result of 
passion and prejudice. Intervenors' brief is replete with 
passion-filled pleas for punitive damages (page 32). The pleas 
are not based on facts in the record. 
In addition, there must be some sort of correlation 
between the actual damages and the punitive damages award. The 
actual damages awarded at trial, excluding interest and attorneys 
fees, was $165,506.56. The trial court awarded $100,000.00 in 
punitive damages, nearly 60\ of actual damages, this is clearly 
excessive. Intervenors ask for an additional $723,101.48 in 
punitive damages which is over 430\ of actual damages, found by 
the trial court 1 
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Intervenors rely on two Utah cases that hold that the 
wrongdoer's wealth is a factor and can be examined in reaching a 
punitive damage award. The action in Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979), was one for malicious prosecution, false arrest and 
false imprisonment arising from an alleged shoplifting incident. 
The plaintiff sought, along with other damages, punitive damages 
of $15,000.00. The jury awarded actual damages and $15,000.00 for 
punitive damages. The trial judge refused to grant $15,000.00 for 
punitive damages declaring them excessive, and found that 
$2,000.00 would be more appropriate. The plaintiffs appealed the 
judges award of $2,000.00 for punitive damages to the Utah Supreme 
Court, whereupon the Court held that $15,000.00 was reasonable and 
that the wealth of the defendant is a factor to be looked at. 
Even with that precedent, Intervenors' claim of over $723,000.00 
is astoundingly excessive, especially where the lack of malice is 
evident. 
The punitive damages sought by Intervenors are based on, 
according to their brief, •uncontroverted facts" and •unequivocal 
facts". However, most if not all are disputable, or have been 
neutralized by the probable cause and good faith actions of the 
Bank. 
In conclusion, punitive damages can only be awarded when 
there is a wrongful act, willfully and maliciously performed by 
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the wrongdoer. The Bank has carefully established that its 
actions were prompted by an abundance of probable cause and good 
faith, not at all motivated by hatred or ill-feeling toward the 
Intervenors. The denial of this claim must be affirmed. 
H. Pre-Judgment Interest 
In the trial court below, the judge awarded pre-judgment 
interest to all five (5) items of damage granted. Intervenors 
seek additional prejudgment interest. 
The law in Utah regarding prejudgment interest would 
require a denial of all such prejudgment interest. 
"The law in Utah is clear, ••• where the 
damage is complete and the amount of the loss is 
fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can 
be measured by facts and figures, interest 
should be allowed from that time and not from 
the date of judgment. On the other hand, where 
damages are incomplete or cannot be calcul~ 
with mathematical accuracy, such as in case of 
personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of 
character, false imprisonment, etc. the amount 
of damage must be ascertained and assessed by 
the trier of fact at the trial and in such cases 
prejudgment interest is not allowed (emphasis 
added). 
Bjork v. April Industries Inc., 560 P2d 315 (Utah 1977). 
All of the damages awarded were totally in the control 
of the trier of fact, and incapable of being calculated with 
mathematical accuracy. Therefore, under the test as outlined 
above in Bjork, it is clear that interest should not have been 
allowed on any of the Intervenors' claims until the date of 
judgment. 
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I. Commentary On Legal Precedents 
Respondent First Security is reluctant, but in candor and 
good conscience required, to observe for the benefit of the Court 
that Intervenors' brief is replete with serious erros in legal 
citations. For example, pages 23 and 234 contain purported 
quotations from six cases. Yet not one of those quotations 
actually appears in the cited court decisions! Moreover, the 
Pacific Reporter citations on Gould and Stewart are not correct. 
It appears to the Respondent that the lack of care and diligence 
in presenting evidence in the trial court is continued in the lack 
of care with respect to legal precedents cited to the court. 
These factors combine to persuade the Court that Intervenors' 
claims here under appeal are not well founded in any degree, 
legally or factually. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent First Security moves this Court to affirm all 
portions of the lower court judgment which denied the additional 
claims for damages sought by Intervenors, for the reasons argued 
at length in this brief. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
~' <42 //f'/.:;  ~ Uk_--(_) ..____ 
Don B. Allen and 
Patrick B. Nolan of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1500 
Attorneys for Respondent 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 
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